INTRODUCTION ous authors that the assumption of descent with modification is not required to justify cladistics, recent debate suggests that there is still confusion surrounding the
At the 1997 Hennig meeting, Kirk Fitzhugh prenecessary and sufficient background knowledge underlysented a talk entitled, "Cladograms as Explanatory ing the method. Three general axioms necessary to justify Hypotheses," in which he claimed, among other things, cladistics-the discoverability of characters, hierarchy, that common ancestry is an inference rule for phylogeand parsimony-are reviewed. Although the assumption netic analysis-that is, that evolutionary theory proof evolution is sufficient to justify cladistics, it is also vides a necessary underlying ontological basis for clasufficient to justify competing approaches like maximum distics. Although that view was shown to be false more likelihood, which suggests that the philosophical support than a decade ago (Platnick, 1979 (Platnick, , 1982 (Platnick, , 1985 ; Nelson for the cladistic approach is strengthened by purging and Platnick, 1981; Patterson, 1982; Rosen, 1982 ; Brady, reference to descent with modification altogether. ᭧ 2000 1985) , subsequent discussion among members of the The Willi Hennig Society audience revealed that substantial difference of opinion persists as to whether a theory of evolution is philosophically antecedent to systematics or systematics provides evidence that allows inference of a scientific "What we call the evolutionary hypothesis is an explanation of a host of biological and paleontological observations-for theory of evolution. In this paper, I will advocate the instance of certain similarities between various species and latter point of view and highlight its utility in the curgenera-by the assumption of the common ancestry of related rent debate surrounding alternate methods of phylogeforms." (Popper, 1957: p. 106) netic inference. Freeing cladistics from traditional assumptions of evolutionary background knowledge is an important epistemological step towards establish-"despite the lack of an explicitly specified evolutionary HISTORY model in parsimony analysis, there are reasons to believe that parsimony makes very stringent and unrealistic assumptions about substitution processes" (Yang Much of Hennig's (1950 Hennig's ( , 1966 ) motivation for developing his theory of phylogenetic systematics was a and Goldman, 1998: p. 357 ). The object of this paper is to show that such claims are unfounded, by explidesire to counter the German school of "idealistic morphological systematics" that was prevalent in the first cating the assumptions of the cladistic method and showing that evolution is not one of them. half of the 20th Century (e.g., Schindewolf, 1950) . Those workers based inferences of relationship on similarity of form, considering phylogeny an irrelevant or derivative explanatory theory. Hennig's great insight was that
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND
although similarity occurs for several reasons (synapo-PARSIMONY morphy, symplesiomorphy, and convergence, the last having long been recognized as not indicative of relationship-see MacLeay, 1822), only special similarity At the 1997 Hennig meeting, Kirk Fitzhugh argued (synapomorphy) is indicative of the pattern of phylothat scientific theories must rest on an ontology-an genetic relationship. Although Hennig (1966) dabbled underlying view about the way things "really are" with set theory as a rationale for the hierarchical arin nature. Since the demise of logical positivism (see rangement of taxa using nested patterns of character Hanfling, 1981) , no philosopher of science has tried to transformation, his main defense for the approach of defend pure empiricism as a plausible methodology. grouping by synapomorphy was based upon evoluHowever, there is an infinity of possible ontologies, so a tionary process assertions. Hennig emphasized that simple corollary to the need for underlying ontological his method depended on the ontological concept of claims is that for a theory to be scientific, its ontology hologenesis, an inductive extrapolation from the obshould correspond as closely as possible to available served processes of development (ontogenesis) and seempirical evidence, that in turn rests on "common xual reproduction (tokogenesis) to the unobserved prosense" background knowledge (Popper, 1979) . Popper cess held to be responsible for the hierarchical pattern (1965: p. 238) defined the background knowledge unof groups nested within groups (phylogenesis). This derlying an hypothesis as "unproblematic" (cf. Siddall was more or less the same inductive argument develand Kluge, 1997) , but this meant only that it was not oped by Darwin (1859: p. 433) to advocate the principle the subject of immediate investigation in tests of the of evolution by natural selection as an explanation for hypothesis, and definitely did not enshrine it as an the perceived hierarchical order of nature.
article of faith immune to subsequent testing. As discussed by Platnick (1979) and Nelson (1989) , Parsimony is an epistemological approach (articuHennig's metaphysical justification for grouping by lated by William Ockham more than 650 years ago; synapomorphy alone is no longer necessary to explain see Kluge, 1984; Rieppel, 1988) that restricts the realm the success of either systematics in general or the claof inferential reasoning to interpretation of evidence distic method in particular, yet it continues to be voiced in the simplest theoretical framework necessary and with approbation at the meetings and in the publicasufficient to account for the data. 2 Extra background tions of this society (e. g. de Queiroz and Donoghue, assumptions should be discarded, because they Frost and Kluge, 1994; Kluge, 1997; Siddall weaken the capacity of the empirical evidence to disand Kluge, 1997) . This is unfortunate, because the accucriminate among competing theories. Popper (1959: p. sation of vague "evolutionary assumptions" in cladis-83) couched his argument for parsimony in the scientics is often used to justify maximum likelihood (ML) tific method in terms of striving to avoid auxiliary methods, usually in the context of a statement such as, "(t)he model of evolutionary process is explicit in maximum-likelihood reconstruction, whereas it is AIII In the absence of evidence to the contrary, any state correshypotheses unless they increase the degree of falsifiponding to a step shared by a group, G, of OTUs is taken to ability or testability of the main hypothesis. dence of grouping; axiom IV says that each character (2) Only one phylogeny of all living and extinct orpotentially offers independent corroboration of an hyganisms exists, and this phylogeny is the result of pothesis of grouping, implying that character congrugenealogical descent;
ence is the measure of clade support. In this view, (3) Characters may be passed from one generation evolution is invoked in moderation, to justify the orderto the next generation, modified or unmodified, ing of transformations among character states and the through genealogical descent.
elimination of symplesiomorphy as evidence of relationship. By contrast, Platnick (1979: p. 538 ) identified These statements contain elements that are necessary three principles that he viewed as guiding cladistics. for the success of the cladistic method, such as the These are assumption of a hierarchical pattern. However, the strong assertions of process are sufficient not only to proaches and are therefore of limited utility in the cause This is the much-vilified "pattern cladist" view, of cladistics. which emphasizes that evolution is an explanatory the- Farris et al. (1970: pp. 172-174) offered this more ory for systematic patterns that are observed based abstract set of phylogenetic axioms: on independent theoretical premises (Brady, 1985 is the theoretical background assumption without which cladistic hypotheses cannot be supposed. Kluge (1997: p. 88) repeatedly asserted this in statements such is descent with modification (Darwin, 1859: p. 420 )." 4 with modification is a (or "the") necessary element of this background knowledge. Platnick (1979) , Brady Kluge pooh-poohed pattern cladistics, implying its guilt-by-association with three-taxon analysis (clearly, (1985) , and Scotland (1992) stated that it is not, arguing instead that evolution is an explanation for indepenpattern cladistics and 3TA have nothing to do with one another except that they share some authors, and dently inferred cladograms. Is common descent the explanans 6 or the explanandum of cladistics? In the critique of the latter, no matter how blistering, is irrelevant to the former). In my view, Kluge's Popperian next few paragraphs, I review what I perceive to be the minimal background knowledge necessary and prolixity does not provide a particularly compelling basis for the cladistic approach 5 (nor am I convinced sufficient to perform each of the steps in a systematic investigation, with special consideration for the necesthat the procrustean effort to equate particular elements of cladistic analysis variously to h, e, and b is sity of a priori evolutionary assumptions. worthwhile). However, the point of this paper is merely to explore the merits of Kluge's claim for the necessity of descent with modification as "the" background asObservation sumption of cladistic analysis.
An observation is an existential statement that relies on theory. All human knowledge of things in the world is inseparably connected to and mediated by the pro-
PROCEDURES AND ASSUMPTIONS
cesses of sensation and cognition (Brady, 1994) . Methods of observing, and therefore observations, are The basic sequence of operations in a cladistic invesjudged to be "objective" by the criterion of intersubjectigation is to observe similarities and differences tive testability, the sophisticated realist approximation among organisms, formalize these observations as ento ontological truth (Popper, 1959: p. 44 ). If everyone tries in a data matrix, and evaluate the data with an agrees that an observation is well-corroborated, then algorithm that infers hierarchically nested sets among it need not be subjected to additional tests before it the organisms from which the observations were can provide plausible background knowledge for subdrawn. Some background knowledge is required to sequent hypotheses (although it may be tested if anyjustify the raw data, its tabulation into a matrix, the one should desire to do so). Such observations can be hierarchical pattern, and the grouping algorithm.
regarded as "facts" for the next stage of analysis. A Farris et al. (1970) , Wiley (1975) , Kluge (1997) RAPD bands.
space and time (contra evolution). The striking similarmay be the least burdened by ad hoc hypotheses and applicable to the broadest range of evidence, thus repity between certain features of different kinds of organisms has also been recognized for a long time, providresenting perhaps the closest approach to the parsimony paradigm (Kluge, 1989 (Kluge, , 1997 , but other aping the foundation for comparative biology (e.g., Belon, 1555) . To deny that the wing of a bird and the arm of proaches have been suggested (e.g., Neff, 1986; Lipscomb, 1992; Goloboff, 1993) . a human are composed of "the same" structures is to deny the observations that have inspired natural
The problems of character coding are complex and may not have a single solution, but the solution or philosophers since Aristotle with the notion of a Natural System. solutions chosen should not depend upon the incorporation of evolutionary background knowledge. One of As Hennig (1966: p. 121) recognized in his "auxiliary principle," parsimony is necessary to interpret similar the major advances of modern systematics is the close attention to exorcising hidden evolutionary assumpfeatures as evidence of taxonomic grouping, because without that assumption there is no empirical basis tions from character descriptions (e.g., a priori designation of polarity). It should be obvious to readers of this for making comparisons between singular phenomena. Sober (1988) discussed a number of complexities in the journal that the congruence of hypothetically identical character states in cladistic analysis supports the exphilosophical justification of common-cause explanations (i.e., parsimony) and suggested that a rationale planatory theory of common ancestry and not the other way around. For cladistic discussions of homology, for assuming common causes should instead be sought proximately, in specific empirical theories. However, see Patterson (1982 ), de Pinna (1991 , and Brower and Schawaroch (1996) . as Popper (1979) argued, the "looks-the-same, is-thesame" discrimination rule seems to be a basic cognitive attribute shared among a wide array of animals, proHierarchy viding among other things the basis for the adaptive success of aposematic coloration and mimicry. Although it is not in principle demonstrable from external evidence (Panchen, 1992) , the existence of a Perceived similarities and differences between organisms provide the raw data of cladistics and in my single, irregularly branching hierarchy of relationships among biological taxa has been considered an empiriview represent the only necessary ontological foundation for the construction of cladograms and hypotheses cal fact by Brady (1985) , based on its historical emergence as the predominant means to represent patterns of taxonomic grouping. There is clearly an ontological leap between tests of individual observations and tests of taxonomic grouping used by pre-evolutionary systematists during the early 19th century. That this ocof "descent with modification," if the latter is even testable without tautology. curred prior to the general acceptance of evolutionary theory by the scientific community is clear evidence that a hierarchical conception of the Natural System is
Constructing a Data Matrix
not dependent on an evolutionary process theory (Crow, 1926; Platnick, 1982) . Codification of observations into a data matrix has been referred to as the bête noire of systematics (Pogue In spite of the occurrence of homoplasy, the irregularly branching hierarchical pattern remains a compeland Mickevich, 1990). There are alternate ways to carve the features of organisms into characters, alternate ling framework for empirical grouping of taxa based on their similarities and differences and the most natural ways to divide characters into states, and alternate ways to relate character states to one another (Pleijel, alternative yet proposed (this argument was offered as early as 1840 by the creationist father of the code 1995). Differential character weighting and step matrices of character state change may also be employed.
of zoological nomenclature, Hugh Strickland). Hierarchy is perhaps best viewed as an epistemological axiom Unordered multistate characters with equal weights like the principle of parsimony, an unprovable but useful criterion for unambiguously ordering the data 7
It should be noted that the advantage of being a Batesian mimic (Panchen, 1992) , that is divorced from any particular is based on the potential predator's mistaken inference of homology between convergent features! causal hypothesis that might be invoked to explain it.
Copyright ᭧ 2000 by The Willi Hennig Society All rights of reproduction in any form reserved de Queiroz and Donoghue (1990: p. 62 ) criticized this hierarchy (Rieppel, 1994; Brower, 1999) . The most practical approach is to study exemplar specimens repreview by arguing that, "(t)he ways that humans represent nature do not necessarily reflect the order inherent senting the diversity of the particular taxa of interest and to seek among them characters that exhibit hierarin nature, for even artificial classes that do not exhibit nested, hierarchical relationships can be fitted into a chical patterns of variation (Vrana and Wheeler, 1992) .
It is useful to sample extensively both at hypothetically hierarchical taxonomy." Their argument is naïve, depending on prior access to metaphysical knowledge more and less inclusive hierarchical levels than the level of interest: the former to test monophyly of the of how things in the world truly relate to one another (which is precious limited, even to Harvard men).
ingroup and the latter to test hierarchical structure among terminals (Judd, 1998) . From a practical perspective, the "fact" or axiom that an irregularly-branching hierarchy (with or without metaphysical justification) is a useful way of depicting One Optimality Criterion 9 patterns of biological diversity underlies all modern systematic approaches. Like the various methods of Although systematists may agree that they are looking for a single hierarchy, they have invented numerous observation discussed above, most systematists accept as plausible background knowledge for their studies methods by which that pattern may be inferred (cf. Sneath and Sokal, 1973) . Interpretations of optimality the assumption that relationships among taxa are productively represented by a hierarchy of groups within criteria differ among the various methodological camps, and the choice of method is therefore subject groups. Perhaps it is this consensus within the scientific community that has promoted the Natural System's to rather intense debate. However, as Felsenstein (1988: p. 529) noted, "(i)t is unsatisfactory to have several ontological reification as a "real" entity that should be sought in the world. 8 In my view, such concern for the competing approaches if it is not understood how they differ in their assumptions, and thus when one ought "real" leads to the position that evidence should be suspect because it may not reflect the "true" pattern of to prefer one to another." I would amplify Felsenstein's sentiment to argue that if we believe that the hierarchy phylogeny (e.g., Swofford et al., 1996) . Such statements about the condition of things in the world irrespective of life is usefully represented by a single pattern of groups nested within groups, it is not satisfactory to of evidence may not be tested by scientific inquiry and do not merit further discussion.
describe parts of that pattern piecemeal by applying different methods, whether we understand the differences among the methods or not. The principle of parsimony articulated above implies that multiple ways to Lower Bound of Hierarchy interpret a single phenomenon are superfluous. The problem subject to more ontological interpreta-A frequently voiced notion (e.g., Kim, 1993) is that tions than any other in systematics is the question of multiple methods of phylogenetic inference should be species, the least inclusive taxa. The nature of species employed because their agreement on an hypothesis is a metaphysical quagmire that has been discussed by of relationships implies its accuracy. That pluralistic myriad authors (for some recent debates, see Frost and approach is illogical (Farris 1977 (Farris , 1979a (Farris , 1982 . There Baum and Donoghue, 1995; Davis, 1997) .
are an infinite number of possible methods that could Epistemologically speaking, it makes absolutely no difcollectively yield any possible topology. Advocates of ference to systematics what (or if) species "are," as long the multiple-methods approach (e.g., Bloomer and as some groups of organisms that possess observable Crowe, 1998) do not employ most of these possible features can be recognized as terminals on a branching methods and do not justify their prejudice in choosing the subset that they do employ (perhaps because most possible methods are not available in popular software 8 e.g., Siddall and Kluge, 1997: p. 319 : "In phylogenetics, however, packages). The current popularity of MP, ML, and NJ we are not interested in some abstract generality regarding the group of taxa we are working with. We are concerned with uncovering the 9 This section should not be construed to advocate any method of actual spatio-temporally real history of divergence, the species genealogy." phylogenetic inference in particular.
does not justify their exclusive use as "the alternative" of a natural classification is "that arrangement of living methods (if these methods are believed to be "good" things which enables the greatest number of inductive because they agree in test cases, then their agreement statements to be made regarding its constituent groups, does not represent much of a test of reliability). To reject and which is therefore the most generally useful for the some methods and not select one method is arbitrary: if investigation of living things." "Gilmour naturalness" some methods are better than others on principle, then became the operational goal of phenetic classification one method is best on the same principle. An analogy in the 1960's (e.g., Sokal and Sneath, 1963) , until Farris to statistical testing is apt: a result may be viewed as (1977, 1979a) beat the pheneticists at their own game significant or not, depending on the choice of statistical by demonstrating that cladistic methods produce more methods. Multiple tests of the same data neither pro-"natural" classifications than phenetic methods do. vide independent confirmation of a result nor increase Naturalness, information content, Popperian boldness, our confidence that a result is true. On the other hand, simplicity, corroboration, and explanatory power are tests that disagree do not together imply that the null directly related concepts in systematics, and all are hypothesis should be both accepted and rejected. A considered to be maximized by the parsimonious arsingle, well-chosen method suffices. rangement of character state change on Wagner networks (Farris, 1979b (Farris, , 1982 (Farris, , 1983 Kluge, 1997) . The traditional distinction between phenetic "group-
The "Natural System" and Cladistics ing according to raw similarity" and cladistic "groupThrowing away cladistics' evolutionary crutches reing according to putative synapomorphy" (e.g., Farris, quires a brief review of the epistemological arguments 1979b; Sober 1988) implies prior knowledge of characsupporting that method over alternative operationalist ter polarity in the cladistic approach, which is usually approaches, such as phenetic methods. The search for justified by invoking descent with modification (e.g., the "true" Natural System of classification of living Farris, 1986) . This would seem to be the major snag things has been a metaphysical goal of systematists for the pattern cladistic rejection of evolution as a part at least since Linné (1758) . By the mid-19th century, of its background knowledge. However, I believe that philosophers had recognized that certain knowledge a more general description of the cladistic interpretaof God's Plan of Creation was inaccessible. Epistemotion of character information avoids this problem: a logical definitions of naturalness were proposed as difference between two character states implies a single plausible and operational alternatives to that unattainchange and as such can only impart information about able systematic nirvana: a single group.
characters and any particular material cause. Farris (1980: p. 391 ) made a similar point: "It might seem that the accuracy of the transformational interpretation depends on that of the phylogenetic hypothesis. As an historical theory, it does indeed, but as a description of the observed character, it is correct whether the postulated phylogeny is right or not." It is the ontological connotation of evolution in the context of biological systematics, and not the word "transformation" itself, which is objectionable (Brady, 1994) .
Character Polarity and Rooting
It hardly needs to be reiterated that in standard cladistic analysis, the length of most parsimonious cladograms is unaffected by the position of the root (Farris, 1970) , that current programs build unrooted networks, and that a priori character polarization is therefore unnecessary (Farris et al., 1970) . Yet the historical dis- or at worst is evidentially vacuous. Such a characterization is simply inappropriate: many hypotheses of relationship are rejected by parsimonious selection of the shortest unrooted cladograms, and only the distinction four pairs of equally "similar" taxa, based on incompatible combinations of shared character states. Grouping of monophyly versus paraphyly of groups remains to be determined by locating the root (Lundberg, 1972) . of AB is implied by characters 2-4, BC by 1, 3, and 4, CD by 1, 2, and 4, and DE by 1-3. If exclusive groups Indeed, as taxa are added to the analysis, the position of the root accounts for a diminishing proportion of are defined by the presence of complementary states, then the evidence of grouping implied by each characpossible topologies (see Appendix). If the discovery of the most parsimonious tree is the essence of cladistics, ter in this matrix disagrees with the evidence implied by each of the others. This internally contradictory then I would argue that unrooted cladograms approach the ultimate goal of cladistic analysis, because rooting pattern of shared character states employed in phenetic similarity measures accounts for the poor naturalness (which implies the directionality of character state change) occurs after tree inference. This point would of phenetic approaches discussed in Farris (1977 Farris ( , 1979a , as well as phenetic problems of taxonomic inseem to recommend the standard approach over threetaxon analysis (for current debate, see Siebert and Wilcongruence due to mosaic evolution (Mickevich and Johnson, 1976; Mickevich, 1978 Mickevich, ). liams, 1998 Farris and Kluge, 1998; de Laet and Smets, 1998) , since the latter's dependence on a priori charac-A criticism here might be that "evolution" and "modification" in their most basic sense are synonymous ter polarization can be viewed as an undesirable auxiliary hypothesis. with "change," as descriptive terms. However unlike some recent authors (e.g., Patterson, 1994; A posteriori rooting can be based on either ontogenetic criteria (Nelson, 1978; de Pinna, 1994) or outWilliams, 1998), I see no necessary connection between the notion of transformation as a relation that unites groups (reviewed in Nixon and Carpenter, 1993) . Regardless of whether one or the other of these is the states of one character with respect to those of other generally superior, neither requires evolutionary backwere plausible, an a priori phylogenetic rationale ground knowledge. The order of appearance of feawould pave the way for the admission of rampant ad tures in ontogeny is empirically observable, and it has hoc systematic argumentation based on evolutionary been employed as a criterion for inferring branching phenomena "beyond the immediately observable" patterns since pre-evolutionary times (von Baer, 1828; (Baum and Donoghue, 1995) , including the models of Barry, 1837). Outgroup rooting is based only on the character state change required by ML methods. Seceasily testable hypothesis that the taxa of the ingroup ond, it is difficult to imagine what empirical pattern are a clade with respect to a particular outgroup. There might be proscribed by a more general assumption of is quite good intersubjective agreement on the monoevolutionary background knowledge, such as "descent phyly of many groups, and where there is not, the tree with modification," as invoked by Kluge (1997) and may be represented as partially unrooted. A rooted others. Descent explains pattern similarity, modificatree is just a representation of a hypothetically distal tion explains pattern difference, and their combination part of a larger (or the single) hierarchy. In any event,
can explain any pattern that might be observed. Popper if the ingroup is connected by more than one branch (1959: p. 92; 1974: p. 136 ) viewed such notions as metato the other taxa represented in an unrooted cladogram, physical and unfalsifiable, which clearly renders them the hypothesis of ingroup monophyly is rejected undesirable as background auxiliary hypotheses. (Brower, 1999) .
Although Willi Hennig's influence on the subsequent development of systematics cannot be overestimated, To summarize this section, the axioms I consider it is necessary to discard metaphysical Hennigian bagnecessary and sufficient for cladistics are:
gage when it no longer serves the interests of the discipline. The assumption of evolution in process cladistics 1. Observed character differences among taxa prois a methodological plesiomorphy (Carpenter, 1987) vide the evidentiary basis; that no longer contributes to the discovery of hierarchi-2. An irregular bifurcating hierarchy is a useful way cal patterns of taxonomic grouping. Nowhere in the to represent relationships among taxa; and 3. Parsimony is the guiding epistemological principrocedures described above, which are those used by ple of the systematic endeavor.
cladists of every stripe today, is an evolutionary assumption required in general or particular. I have tried to show that these three rules (one ontoThe process of phylogeny that explains the hierarchilogical, two and three epistemological) logically entail cal patterns discovered by systematics is one of the all the other criteria, such as grouping by synapomormost profound empirical theories of modern science. phy, that are frequently invoked as a priori axioms of I have not claimed that macroevolution is poorly corcladistics (cf. Farris et al., 1970; Scotland, 1992) . "Pattern roborated and therefore not intersubjectively plausible cladistics" is thus a tenable position, but is it better (macroevolution is one of my personal favorite theothan "process cladistics"? ries, and I teach my undergraduate students that it is "true"). Instead, my argument is that the theory of macroevolution is corroborated by evidence from sys-
PATTERN CLADISTICS REDUX
tematics (i.e., comparative anatomy, paleontology, biogeography, and more, recently, comparative biochemistry). Therefore, the a priori assumption of descent with Much of Hennig's ontological justification of phylomodification fails to provide independent ontological genetic systematics was feeble, for two reasons. First, support for systematics. If "the background knowledge the bearing of the "facts" (the processes of ontogeny of descent with modification" underlying cladistics is and tokogeny) he asserted to support the existence of not testable by independent means, it would seem to the process of phylogeny that in turn accounted for be more a metaphysical First Principle like vitalism or the hierarchical pattern of taxonomic groups is a metaorthogenesis than a component of a Popperian hypophorical extrapolation from observed short-term to unobserved long-term processes. Even if that argument thetico-deductive approach.
Even if a testable assumption of evolution were sufis no coherent and defensible basis for the ideas espoused. Cladists can do better. ficient to justify a subsidiary and derivative systematics, the discussion above shows that it is unnecessary. Because evolution-based systematics relies on supernumerary assumptions, it has lower explanatory APPENDIX power than and is philosophically inferior to pattern cladistics. Siddall and Kluge (1997) have criticized the ML approach with the argument that it is a basic logical
The number of unrooted bifurcating topologies is fallacy to justify a method with a theory that is derived equal to directly or indirectly from the results of that method, and Kluge (1997: p. 91 ) has stressed that, "(a)dding (2t Ϫ 3)! 2 (tϪ2) (t Ϫ 2)! , to background knowledge is a verificationist slippery slope, which ultimately leads to tautology." It is thus where t is the number of terminal taxa (Edwards and alarming to find these authors proclaiming that their Cavalli-Sforza, 1964; Fitch and Margoliash, 1968) . For process cladistics is predicated upon the same ontologiany one of these trees, the number of possible positions cal slippery slope that the advocates of ML have enthuof the root is equal to 2t Ϫ3. Adding one taxon increases siastically descended.
the number of unrooted topologies by 2(t ϩ 1) Ϫ 3, Although pattern cladistics should hold a strong apbut the number of possible positions of the root on peal to those who see parsimony as the guiding princiany one of these by only 2. Therefore, as t increases, ple of the systematic endeavor, the recent literature is the position of the root becomes a smaller and smaller pocked with attacks against that perspective from a factor in determining the hierarchical pattern of groupvariety of recidivist philosophical camps (e.g., de ing among the taxa. Queiroz and Gauthier, 1990; Baum and Donoghue, A simpler way to envision this is to consider two 1995). Kluge and various coauthors have argued from adjacent (or "neighboring" sensu Lundberg, 1972) a diversity of such positions over the past few years terminals on an unrooted network of t taxa. There are in this very journal. To wit, when discussing total evi2t Ϫ 3 branches in the network, and only placing the dence, Kluge and Wolf (1993) advocated abduction to root on one of the two branches leading to the two the best explanation as an alternative to hypothesis terminals will imply that they are not sister taxa, a testing in a Popperian framework. In their investigaratio of tion of the nature of species, Frost and Kluge (1994) adopted a similar abductivist point of view against 2 2t Ϫ 3 . the hypothetico-deductivist view of taxa as universal statements (essential classes; see Popper, 1959; Kitts and Kitts, 1979) and argued that "operationalism can Obviously, as t increases, the chances that neighboring be the result of failure to appreciate that consilience of taxa in an unrooted cladogram will not be sister taxa inductions marks progress in science" (p. 286). On the in the rooted cladogram decreases. Although the arguother hand, refutationist hypothetico-deductivism unment is more complicated for internal nodes connectderlain by "the background knowledge of descent with ing larger adjacent parts of an unrooted network, the modification" was wielded against "verificationist" basic idea still holds. views (including consilience) in Kluge (1997) , while "sophisticated falsificationism" is used to the same ends in Siddall and Kluge (1997) . Philosophy is central ACKNOWLEDGMENTS to the advance of theoretical systematics, but when inconsistently invoked as a weapon of convenience, the label of "mumbo jumbo" may indeed be apt. Bewil- vice, but the rhetoric is ultimately self-defeating if there
